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A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF BASEBALL'S THREE
ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
JOSEPH J. MCMAHON, JR.* AND JOHN P. RossI**
I. INTRODUCTION
What is professional baseball? It is difficult to answer this ques-
tion without using a value-laden term which, in effect, tells us more
about the speaker than about the subject. Professional baseball
may be described as a "sport,"' our "national pastime,"2 or a "busi-
ness."3 Use of these descriptors reveals the speaker's judgment as
to the relative importance of professional baseball to American soci-
ety. Indeed, all of the aforementioned terms are partially accurate
descriptors of professional baseball. When a Scranton/Wilkes-
Barre Red Barons fan is at Lackawanna County Stadium 4 ap-
plauding a home run by Gene Schall, 5 the fan is engrossed in the
game's details. At that moment, the "baseball as sport" motif accu-
rately describes professional baseball. When professional baseball
is shut down by differences between players and owners, 6 the "base-
* B.A, 1992, La Salle University; J.D., Villanova University, 1995. I thank Pro-
fessor Howard R. Lurie of the Villanova University School of Law for his helpful
editorial assistance.
** Professor of History, La Salle University. B.A., 1958, La Salle University,
MA., 1960, University of Notre Dame; Ph.D., 1965, University of Pennsylvania.
Professor Rossi provided significant editorial assistance to Mr. McMahon.
1. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1920), afft'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972).
3. Id. at 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4. The Scranton/Wilkes-Barre Club is the minor league Triple-A affiliate club
of the Philadelphia Phillies. Lackawanna County Stadium (located in Penn-
sylvania) has been the home of the Red Barons since 1989.
5. At the time of publication, Gene Schall was the starting first baseman for
the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre Red Barons. During 1991 (his junior year at Villanova
University), Schall led the NCAA in hitting with a .484 batting average. Dave Cald-
well, This Phils Prospect Is More than a Player, PHILA. INQ., May 10, 1993, at MC8.
6. Upon beginning the writing of this Article, Major League Baseball (MLB)
was marred by the longest strike in its history. Differences between team owners
and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) led to the cancella-
tion of the 1994 World Series. Many baseball fans wondered whether professional
baseball would be played in 1995. In February, 1995, the owners unilaterally re-
nounced several parts of baseball's labor agreement, including the salary arbitra-
tion system, anti-collusion protection for free-agent players, and competitive
bidding for free-agent players. Jayson Stark, Baseball's Back in Business Without Lock-
out, Opening Day Set, PHILA. INQ., Apr. 3, 1995, at A6. The players went back to
work when the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(213)
1
McMahon: A History and Analysis of Baseball's Three Antitrust Exemptions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
214 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
ball as business" motif occupies the newspaper sports pages with
mentions of collective bargaining offers and counteroffers. 7 When
a university student takes a course discussing the history of baseball
and compares the development of our nation with the development
of professional baseball, the student is impressed by the portrayal of
baseball as our "national pastime."s
Defining the scope of professional baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion is a task which is as elusive as defining professional baseball. In
1922, the United States Supreme Court held in Federal Baseball Club,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Club (Federal Baseball)
that the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) did not apply to pro-
fessional baseball. 10 The Court decided Federal Baseball as a matter
of statutory interpretation, concluding that professional baseball
was not engaged in 1920-style interstate commerce." In order for
section one of the Sherman Act to apply to its conduct in 1922,
professional baseball would have had to manufacture a product and
ship it across state lines. 12
Understanding the history of professional baseball's antitrust
exemptions requires an appreciation of the difference between an
antitrust exclusion and an antitrust exemption. The Federal Baseball
Court did not create an exemption from the antitrust laws.' 3 How-
issued an injunction restoring the aforementioned provisions of the labor agree-
ment. Id.
7. See, e.g., Jayson Stark, Hope Takes Root in the Warmth of Baseball Talks, PHILA.
INQ., Mar. 2, 1995, at DI.
8. Professor Rossi has been teaching a course entitled "America Through
Baseball: An Examination of the Relationship Between Baseball and American
History, 1830 to the Present" in the History Department at La Salle University for
eight years. He occasionally teaches a similar course as an elective offered in the
University's Honors Program.
9. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. at 209.
11. See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. at 209. Justice Holmes noted that "personal effort, not related to
production, is not a subject of commerce. That which in its consummation is not
commerce does not become commerce among the States because [the Leagues
require players to travel across state lines and pay for such travel]." Id.
12. Gary Halley, Anatomy of a Murder. The Federal League and the Courts, THE
NAT'L PAsit, Spring 1985, at 62, 73.
13. Nothing in the Supreme Court's Federal Baseball opinion indicates that the
Court believed that baseball was not subject to the Sherman Act simply because it
was baseball. The Court based its reasoning upon statutory construction of the
terms "trade" and "commerce," and not upon a "recognition and an acceptance of
baseball's unique characteristics and needs." Food, 407 U.S. at 282; see Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. at
208-09 (holding that giving exhibitions of baseball is not "trade" or "commerce"
for Sherman Act purposes); Barton J. Menitove, Comment, Baseballs Antitrust Ex-
[Vol. II: p. 213
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ever, the antitrust exclusion defined in Federal Baseball is commonly
viewed as the source of baseball's exemption from the Sherman
Act.14 If professional baseball is excluded from the Sherman Act,
the statute does not apply because the activities of professional
baseball do not fall within the range of activities the statute was
designed to monitor. Therefore, if the Sherman Act does not ap-
ply, professional baseball's activities are incapable of conflicting
with the policies underlying the Sherman Act. In the case of an
exemption, there is an initial assumption that the Sherman Act may
apply, or should apply, to professional baseball. However, because
of policy reasons which supersede the underlying policies of the
Sherman Act, the Sherman Act does not apply to a particular range
of professional baseball's activities which would normally be subject
to antitrust scrutiny.
By fusing the exclusion with the exemption, the Supreme
Court has created a historical problem which has engaged courts
emption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. IrN~us. & COM. L. REv. 737, 740 (1971)
(noting that Federal Baseball decision was based upon conclusion that professional
baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce).
One of the major failures of legal scholarship on the issue of baseball's anti-
trust exemption is its willingness to embrace the logical fallacy that, since the Fed-
eral Baseball Court determined in 1922 that professional baseball was not engaged
in "trade" or "commerce" under the Sherman Act, Congress intended for profes-
sional baseball to receive special treatment, and therefore professional baseball
should not be subject to the antitrust laws. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,
346 U.S. 356, 360 (1953) (Burton,J., dissenting) (noting that "the [Federal Baseball]
Court did not state that even if the activities of organized baseball amounted to
interstate trade or commerce those activities were exempt from the Sherman
Act"); William D. Neary, Note, 32 TEX. L. REv. 890, 892 (1954) (observing that the
Federal Baseball Court "did not reach the question whether Congress intended the
Sherman Act to govern organized baseball in the event that its activities should be
categorized as interstate commerce"). There is no justification for inferring a spe-
cific congressional intent from judicial construction of statutory terms in this
context.
14. This view is erroneous. Baseball did not have an exemption until the
Court was willing to uphold Federal Baseball as a matter of judicial policy. The ex-
emption was created when the Toolson Court decided to uphold the Federal Baseball
ruling for two primary reasons: first, professional baseball supposedly had devel-
oped significant interests by relying upon the Federal Baseball holding; and second,
Congress had not altered the exemption during the thirty years between the Federal
Baseball and Tooson rulings. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (recogniz-
ing that exemption is based upon "baseball's unique characteristics and needs");
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (affirming Ninth Circuit's
decision on authority of Federal Baseball). But see Y. Shukie Grossman, Note, Anti-
trust and Baseball - A League of Their Own, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 563, 579 (1993) (arguing that Federal Baseball Court granted baseball exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws); Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the
Continuing Vitality of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v.
Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 21 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REv.
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and commentators for more than seventy years.15 The Federal Base-
ball Court did not hold that the business of exhibiting baseball
games was exempt from the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, the Court
used the Federal Baseball exclusion in deciding both Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc. and Flood v. Kuhn.16 The Toolson and Flood cases
held that professional baseball was exempt from the Sherman Act
for judicial and/or public policy reasons.
17
The task of reconciling the exclusion created by Federal Baseball
with the exemption established in Toolson and Flood has been left to
lower federal courts and state courts. It is extremely difficult to ar-
gue that the Federal Baseball Court intended the words "business of
baseball" (or any other phrase) to become the parameters which
would define the scope of an antitrust exemption.18 It is even more
difficult to argue that courts have justified using the "business of
baseball" language (or any other phrase) to define the scope of the
exemption.19
15. See, e.g., Professional Baseball Schs. and Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d
1085, 1085-86 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (citing Rood to support proposition
that MLB is exempt from antitrust laws); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d
527, 541 (7th Cir.) (observing that Rood Court followed Federal Baseball), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263, 266-67 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (interpreting Rood as following
Toolson and Federal Baseball on stare decisis basis); Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes:
A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 209, 219-21 (1983) (concluding that Rood Court refused to overturn Tool-
son and Federal Baseball); H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investiga-
tion of Professional Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REv. 369, 381 (1988)
(noting that Rood Court followed Toolson and Federal Baseball on stare decisis basis);
Remy Kessler, Note, 4 Loy. ENT. L.J. 197, 199 (1984) (interpreting Rood as refusing
to end Federal Baseball exemption).
16. Rood, 407 U.S. at 285; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
17. fRood, 407 U.S. at 285; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
18. Some variation of the "business of baseball" language, as used in the Fed-
eral Baseball opinion, is merely descriptive in nature. The words "business [of] giving
exhibitions of baseball" are used to describe the particular business under review.
See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. at 208. One will search the Federal Baseball opinion in vain for any indica-
tion that the Court intended the "business of baseball" language (or other phrases
used by post-Rood courts reviewing the exemption) to define the scope of an indus-
try-specific antitrust exemption. The absence of such language is consistent with
the view that the Federal Baseball Court was not creating, nor did it intend to create,
an antitrust exemption for professional baseball based on a policy rationale.
Counsel for the National League argued in Federal Baseball that, even if Organized
Baseball was engaged in interstate commerce, the alleged conduct did not violate
the Sherman Act. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting). However, the
Court did not address that issue in its ruling. Id.
19. The critical observer who reads the opinions of post-Rood courts constru-
ing the scope of baseball's antitrust exemption will notice that reviewing courts are
at a loss to provide a precise citation to support their conclusions. See, e.g., Profes-
sional Baseball Schs. and Clubs, Inc., 693 F.2d at 1085-86 (citing Federal Baseball Tool-
son, and Rood to support conclusion that business of baseball is exempt from
[Vol. II: p. 213
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Even though the Federal Baseball Court did not exempt profes-
sional baseball from the Sherman Act, courts and commentators
have successfully manufactured a Federal Baseball "exemption" dur-
ing the time since the opinion was issued seventy-three years ago.
This manufacturing process has led to the creation of professional
baseball's three antitrust exemptions. For purposes of this Article
the three exemptions are referred to as: first, the "whole business"
exemption; second, the "reserve system and league structure" ex-
emption; and third, the "reserve system" exemption.2 0
Part Two of this Article will trace the history of professional
baseball's antitrust exemptions around the basepaths, with Federal
Basebal4 Toolson, and Rood acting as first, second, and third bases,
respectively. Part Three will send the runner from third to home by
describing baseball's three antitrust exemptions. Part Four will
consider the irony of "congressional action" on the issue of base-
ball's antitrust status. Part Five will consider the meaning of the
three exemptions in the antitrust context. Part Six will conclude
the Article by using Parts Two through Four as a "backstop" to eval-
uate the recent litigation concerning the proposed sale and move
of the San Francisco Giants to St. Petersburg, Florida.
antitrust laws). In Professional Baseball Schs. and Clubs, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit did
not provide pinpoint citations indicating that the Court has defined the scope of
the exemption as the "business of baseball." See id. at 1086. Pinpoint citations
were not provided because the Court clearly has never defined the scope of the
exemption.
As an indication of the confusion surrounding the exemption issue, one fed-
eral court recently described the "business of baseball" as language characterizing
the exempted market (as opposed to describing the language as defining the scope
of an exemption which covers any market which MLB chooses to participate in).
See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 439-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Compare Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 541 (holding that "business of baseball,
not any particular facet of that business," is exempt from antitrust laws) with Piazza,
831 F. Supp. at 439-41 (noting in dicta that exemption not only has limited scope,
but is limited to particular market entitled the "business of baseball").
20. See Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 541 (providing example of "whole
business" exemption); Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438 (providing example of "reserve
system" exemption); Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
799 F. Supp. 1475, 1487-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (providing example of "reserve system
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II. A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
A. From Home Plate to First Base:
The Pre-Federal Baseball Years
1. The Advent of Professionalism
Baseball mythology recounts that in 1839, General Abner
Doubleday invented the game in Cooperstown, New York.2 1 The
game's popularity quickly spread throughout New York City and its
surrounding vicinity22 with the organization of the Knickerbocker
21. BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL 2 (1992); Note, Baseball and the Law - Yes-
terday and Today, 32 VA. L. REV. 1164, 1165 (1946) [hereinafter Baseball and the
Law]. Baseball's origin was the subject of a debate between Henry Chadwick, the
top baseball writer of the late nineteenth century, and Albert G. Spalding, the
sporting goods millionaire and owner of the Chicago White Stockings. WARREN
LDSTEIN, PLAYING FOR KEEPS 11 (1989). Chadwick believed that baseball was a
descendant of "rounders," an English game. HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE
EARLYYEARs 9 (1960) [hereinafter SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS]. As a young man, Spald-
ing subscribed to Chadwick's theory. PETER LEVINE, A.G. SPALDING AND THE RISE
OF BASEBALL 112 (1985). However, by 1905 Spalding was convinced that a game
that was "so fundamentally representative of American values had to be American
in origin." Id.
Spalding called for the appointment of a national board to settle the debate.
SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra, at 9. Seven men were selected: James E. Sullivan, Al
Reach, George Wright, Nick Young, Abraham G. Mills, and United States Senators
Arthur Gorman of Maryland and Morgan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut. LEVINE,
supra, at 113. All seven men were arguably interested in the outcome of the de-
bate; all were prominent players in Organized Baseball's early years. SEYMOUR,
EARLY YEARS, supra, at 9. The Mills Commission collected testimony for three years
and concluded that General Abner Doubleday devised the game at Cooperstown,
New York in 1839. ROBERT W. HENDERSON, BALL, BAT AND BISHOP 180 (1947).
In affirming the validity of the "Doubleday myth," the Mills Commission relied
primarily on a letter from Abner Graves. ROBERT SMITH, BASEBALL 30-31 (1947). A
mining engineer who worked in Denver, Colorado, Graves claimed that Doubleday
was a classmate of his who "had interrupted a game of marbles behind the local
tailor shop to draw a diagram in the shape of a baseball diamond while he ex-
plained the game and gave it a name." LEVINE, supra, at 113. Several historians
dispute the validity of the Doubleday myth for various reasons. First, Doubleday
had matriculated at West Point in 1838, making his presence at Green's Select
School in Cooperstown in 1839 an impossibility. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra, at
10. Second, it is unlikely that any Commission members besides Mills saw any of
the evidence, HENDERSON, Supra, at 183, and since Mills and General Doubleday
eventually became members in the same GAR post, SMITH, supra, at 30, there is a
reasonable possibility of bias. Third, Americans simply wanted to believe the
Doubleday myth more than the rounders theory because nobody wanted to believe
that the "national pastime" was of British origin. See SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra,
at 9. But cf. GOLDSTEIN, supa, at 11 (arguing that debate over Doubleday myth is
irrelevant because "competing versions of baseball history" have been part of game
from its inception).
22. RADER, supra note 21, at 5. During 1854 and 1855 at least three new clubs
appeared in Manhattan, while seven new clubs appeared in Brooklyn. Id. By the
summer of 1861 there were at least 200 teams playing in the New York metropoli-
tan area. Id.
[Vol. II: p. 213
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Base Ball Club of New York.23 Baseball's popularity grew in 1858
when the twenty-two New York metropolitan area clubs formed the
National Association of Base Ball Players (National Association or
Association) 24 Initially, the Association was a regional body gov-
erned by a constitution and by-laws. The National Association regu-
lated member clubs and their players. 25  Association rules
23. The Knickerbockers "were primarily a social club with a distinctively ex-
clusive flavor - somewhat similar to what country clubs represented in the 1920's
and 1930's, before they became popular with the middle class. .. ." SEYMOUR,
EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 15. Seymour further describes the Knickerbockers
as follows:
To the Knickerbockers a ball game was a vehicle for genteel amateur rec-
reation and polite social intercourse rather than a hard-fought contest for
victory. They were more expert with the knife and fork at post-game ban-
quets than with bat and ball on the diamond. Their rules and regulations
emphasized proper conduct, and the entire tone of their organization
was more akin to the atmosphere surrounding cricket - a far cry from
the ethic of modem professional baseball.
Id. For a discussion of the history of the Knickerbockers, see RADER, supra note 21,
at 3-5; SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 15-21.
24. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEAPs, supra note 21, at 35. The Association governed the
game for thirteen years. Id. at 37. It was the first centralized governing agency in
American baseball history. Id. The Association produced a set of common playing
rules. Id.
The 1858 convention was a follow-up to a 1857 meeting hosted by the Knicker-
bockers, which was attended by approximately forty delegates representing over
twelve metropolitan-area clubs. See id. at 35. Although a committee on playing
rules was appointed at the 1857 meeting, the committee did not accomplish any-
thing because the young clubs lost interest in the collective effort. See id.
25. SEYMOUR, THE EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 36. Harold Seymour ex-
plained the requirements of Association membership:
To join the Association a club needed a minimum of eighteen mem-
bers and was required to submit its application thirty days before the an-
nual convention so its character and standing could be investigated in
time to be voted on. A two-thirds vote was required for admission. If a
club was not organized until after the convention, it could get probation-
ary status until formally accepted at the next annual meeting. Each mem-
ber club was allowed two delegates and two votes. Dues were at first five
dollars, but over the years were gradually reduced to fifty cents.
The Association regulated players, too. To play in match games, a
man had to be a member of his club for thirty days beforehand. If he left
one club to join another, he must show a clean financial slate before mak-
ing the change. No one was eligible to play who received compensation
at any time, and no player, umpire, or scorer was permitted to be inter-
ested "directly or indirectly" in a bet on the game. This rule was made
progressively more stem and explicit, because the inroads of professional-
ism and betting soon compelled it. To handle disputes and violations the
Association set up a nine-man Judiciary Committee. Charges against a
player or club were to be submitted to the Secretary of the Association in
writing. He turned them over to the Committee, which had to hand
down its decision within ten days. However, its rulings were subject to
review and reversal by a two-thirds vote of the convention delegates at the
end of the year. This later proved to be a fatal weakness.
State and regional associations were pocket editions of the national
body. Admission requirements were essentially the same. A player or
7
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prevented players from receiving compensation 26 or betting on
games. 27 The Association's work in overseeing the game's develop-
ment helped to quickly make baseball America's favorite game.28
Popularity, however, had its price. The vices of professionalism
started to appear at home plate in 1860.29 Competing teams lured
players to join them by using "gifts."30 Such gifts eventually led to a
practice called "revolving." Revolving was a practice where players
would enter into agreements with clubs and then break the agree-
ments in order to accept better offers with other clubs.31 Money
became an even bigger factor in baseball once people became will-
ing to pay admission to games.3 2 Gambling on the outcome of the
games was inevitable and corrupted the game.3 3 Unfortunately, the
club that conspired to throw a game was barred from membership, and,
furthermore, member clubs were forbidden to play a team harboring any
such player. State judiciary committees were armed with authority to
summon members and their books and papers, and to suspend and ex-
pel. But they, too, could be overruled.
Id. at 36-37.
26. RADER, supra note 21, at 21.
27. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 36.
28. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 72-73. Following the Civil War, new clubs
formed at an extraordinary rate. Id. at 72. In 1865, New York and Brooklyn clubs
represented 30% of the national number; by 1867, New York and Brooklyn clubs
represented 15% of the national number. See id. at 73. This percentage change
signalled a shift of "[t] he center of gravity of the baseball world" to the western
United States. Id. For a table charting the number of clubs and states represented
at Association meetings from 1860-66, see id. at 72.
29. In 1860, the Brooklyn Excelsiors reportedly paid Jim Creighton under the
table, making him the first known professional baseball player. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 21, at 70; SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 48-49. Other historians
contend that Al Reach was the first professional player. See SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS,
supra note 21, at 48. Reach played for the Brooklyn Eckfords and the Philadelphia
Athletics during the early 1860s. Id.
30. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 48.
31. JAMES B. DwORIuN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS 41 (1981); GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 21, at 84-85; SEYMOUR, EARLYVYEARS, supra note 21, at 51. Revolving occurred
before the spread of professionalism, but money certainly added a new dimension
to its practice. See SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 51.
Clubs sought to acquire "revolvers" to strengthen their starting lineups. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 21, at 85. Although revolving was covered by the baseball press as
early as 1860, criticism of revolving did not begin until 1866, when National Associ-
ation membership increased from 91 clubs to over 200 clubs. Id. Players from
New York City and Cooperstown moved to other Northeast and Midwest cities. Id.
The instability of starting lineups from season to season "both encouraged and
distressed baseball commentators, especially those based in the New York area."
Id.
32. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra note 21, at 49-50. In 1868 the seven or eight
most popular clubs combined earned approximately $100,000 in gate receipts. Id.
at 50. The Mutuals reportedly earned approximately $15,000 from playing games
for gate receipts. Id.
33. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARs, supra note 21, at 52. The problem with betting on
games was that bettors wanted a sure bet. Id. at 53. This inevitably led to "active"
[Vol. II: p. 213
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Association did not have the power to control these problems,
thereby rendering its attempts to exercise control futile.
3 4
The inability of the Association to govern the evils of
professsionalism underscored a division among member clubs on
the professionalism issue itself. The Association's purists gradually
conceded that professional baseball was a viable idea.35 The Associ-
ation eliminated the distinction between amateur and professional
players.3 6 America's first all-professional club, the Cincinnati Red
Stockings, was organized in 1869.37 The success of the Red Stock-
ings led to the formation of more professional clubs38 and gradu-
ally eliminated the influence of the amateur clubs within the
Association. s9 The trend toward professionalism culminated in the
dissolution of the Association in 1871.40
During March, 1871, ten professional clubs met in New York
and established the National Association of Professional Base Ball
participation by bettors and fixed games. Id. In California, there were incidents
where, just as a player was about to catch a fly ball or field a ground ball, a bettor
who bet on the opposing team would fire a six-shooter with the hope of making
the player misplay the ball. Id. RADER, supra note 21, at 20.
Fixed games were a larger problem than a six-shooter distracting players.
Throwing games was referred to as "hippodroming." SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra
note 21, at 53. The first baseball scandal involved a fixed game. The September
28, 1865 game between the Mutuals and Eckfords was unexpectedly won by the
Eckfords, 28-11. Id. Later, players Ed Duffy and William Wansley of the Eckfords
were accused of offering Thomas Devyr money to throw the game. Id. The case
was investigated by the Judiciary Committee of the National Association. Id. For a
discussion of the Devyr case, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 90-94; SEYMOUR,
EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 53-54.
34. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 54. The Association's eligibility
rules and its regulations against betting and paying players were ignored because
the Judiciary Committee did not punish anyone. See id. The Judiciary Committee
was only capable of settling minor cases. Id.
35. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 55.
36. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 92; see SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21,
at 56 (describing events leading up to the amateur/professional split).
37. RADER, supra note 21, at 25. The Red Stockings broke the dominance of
New York baseball. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 106. The Red Stockings went
through the 1869 season with one loss and one tie, the tie occurring when the
Haymakers of Troy, N.Y. angrily left the field in protest of an umpire's decision.
RADER, supra note 21, at 25. For a discussion of the history of the Cincinnati club
before it became a professional club, see GoLDsIN, supra note 21, at 103-08. For
a discussion of the history of the Cincinnati club from 1869 until the club's demise
in 1870, see id. at 112-19; RADER, supra note 21, at 25-28; SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs,
supra note 21, at 59.
38. SEYMOUR, EARLY YF.ARS, supra note 21, at 59.
39. Id.
40. See id. Twenty-six amateur clubs met in New York in March, 1871, and
formed the National Association of Amateur Base Ball Players. GOLDS'EIN, supra
note 21, at 126; SEYMOUR, EARLYYARS, supra note 21, at 70. For a discussion of the
amateurist movement, see GOLDSrEIN, supra note 21, at 126-33.
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Players (NAPBBP).41 While the NAPBBP lasted only five years, 42 it
changed professional baseball by addressing three issues: establish-
ing an official championship, overseeing rule changes, and enforc-
ing player contracts. 43 Unfortunately, the NAPBBP had no
screening mechanism to forecast or assess a club's financial posi-
tion during the membership application process." This lack of a
screening mechanism, combined with high player salaries, led to
several club failures.45 The club failures caused tensions between
the financially successful clubs and the other clubs.4
These tensions and club financial instability sparked the crea-
tion of the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (Na-
tional League) in 1876.47 The National League admitted fifteen
41. Baseball and the Law, supra note 21, at 1165.
42. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 134.
43. Id. at 135. The NAPBBP had "moderate success" dealing with these issues.
Id. A "champion" was designated each year, and the NAPBBP was recognized as
the authority on baseball rules. Id. However, the NAPBBP was no more effective
than the National Association in dealing with the issue of revolving. The NAPBBP
rules stated that a player could revolve to another team, but would have to wait 60
days before playing in his first game. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 42. Since most
revolving occurred during the off-season, this NAPBBP attempt to regulate revol-
ving was useless. See id. For a discussion of revolving, see supra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
44. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 146.
45. Id.
46. Id. Of the five NAPBBP pennants, four were won by the Boston Red
Stockings (managed by Harry Wright) and one by the Philadelphia Athletics. Id.
Both the Red Stockings and the Athletics were commercially successful clubs. Id.
Benjamin Rader described the primary reason for Boston's dominance:
Boston's phenomenal success stemmed in large part from the re-
cruitment of superior players. Wright had at his disposal his brother
George, a superb fielding, hard-hitting shortstop. At second base, he em-
ployed Roscoe Barnes, the league's perennial batting champion, and be-
hind the plate was the league's most admired superstar, Jim "Deacon"
White. White picked up his nickname because, unlike most of his fellow
players, he regularly attended church services, toted a Bible with him
wherever he went, and always behaved as 'a gentleman in his professional
and private life.' In the pitcher's box, White had big Albert Spalding,
who at six feet and two inches in height towered over his contemporaries
and was the league's most successful hurler. Spalding compiled a 207-56
won-lost record and a .320 batting average while at Boston. 'On receiving
the ball,' read a contemporary account of Spalding's pitching style, '....
he gazes at it two or three minutes in a contemplative way, and then turns
it around once or twice to be sure it is not an orange or coconut. Assured
that he has the genuine article ... and after a scowl at the shortstop, and
a glance at homeplate, [he] finally delivers the ball with the precision of a
cannon shot.'
RADER, supra note 21, at 38; see also LEINE, supra note 21, at 13-19 (describing A.G.
Spalding's role in the success of the Red Stockings).
47. GoLDsrmN, supra note 21, at 147. For an excellent discussion of the
events leading up to the formation of the National League, see SEYMOUR, EARLY
YEAtRs, supra note 21, at 75-85.
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teams during its first four years of existence. 48 However, by 1879
the League had lost eight of those teams due to financial difficul-
ties. 49 It was obvious to club owners and managers that player sala-
ries needed to be reduced significantly if they wanted to remain in
business.50 This realization led to the development of the reserve
system.
2. The Reserve System
On September 29, 1879, the National League owners secretly
agreed to adopt an idea introduced by Arthur Soden, the owner of
the Boston Red Stockings.51 Soden proposed that each owner be
allowed to keep five players off the market.52 The "reservation" of a
player meant that no League team could use his services. 5 Further-
more, no League team could play against a team which fielded a
player reserved to another club.M
The reserve system saved professional baseball.55 As intended,
the rule reduced club operating expenses by reducing the cost of
player salaries.56 In addition, the reserve system aided the League's
competitive balance by preventing the financially-successful teams
from contracting with a large number of talented players. 57 Over-
all, the reserve system improved the financial condition of the Na-
tional League.
58
America's economic prosperity was another factor in the im-
proved financial condition of the National League.59 Industrial
48. Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust
Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 586 (1953).
49. Id.; see also SEYMOUR, EARLY YEA.s, supra note 21, at 86-87 (detailing club
failures during years 1876-1879).
50. GOLDSrEIN, supra note 21, at 149; SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARs, supra note 21, at
106.
51. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 44; LEVINE, supra note 21, at 50; cf. Richard B.
Blackwell, Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an
Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 859, 861 (1971).
52. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 44; Blackwell, supra note 51, at 861.
53. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 44; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 149.
54. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEas, supra note 21, at 108.
55. Blackwell, supra note 51, at 861; see SEYMOUR, EARLY YEAS, supra note 21,
at 119; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 149 (noting that National League Presi-
dent Abraham Mills believed reserve rule served players as well as clubs by bringing
stability to National League).
56. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 116; Blackwell, supra note 51, at
861.
57. Blackwell, supra note 51, at 861; see SEYMOUR, EARLY Y.a s, supra note 21,
at 111 (noting that need for competitive balance is argument made by reserve
system proponents).
58. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 46-47.
59. RADER, supra note 21, at 47.
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production, real incomes, and spectator demand for baseball in-
creased during the 1880's.60 The number of professional teams
and leagues grew to meet increased spectator demands6' and led to
the formation of the American Association of Base Ball Clubs
(American Association) in 1881.62 In contrast to the National
League, the American Association authorized members to play on
Sundays (where permitted by law), set an admission price of twenty-
five cents per game (as opposed to the National League admission
price of fifty cents per game), and allowed beer to be sold at its
games.63 The American Association used these measures to attract
the large population of Americans who were alienated by the Na-
tional League's stolid, Victorian manners. 64
The National League considered the American Association to
be a serious competitor.65 The National League also recognized
that the reserve system was ineffective if there was a league compet-
ing for its players. 66 To combat the American Association threats,
National League President Abraham G. Mills negotiated the Na-
tional Agreement of 1882 between the National League, the Ameri-
can Association, and the Northwestern League (a minor league).67
The Agreement included the adoption of the reserve rule, allowing
each member club to reserve a maximum of eleven players.68 To-
gether, the parties allied under the National Agreement (or Tripar-
tite Agreement) were referred to as "Organized Baseball."
69
60. Id.
61. Id. By the end of the 1880's 19 professional leagues had been created. See
id. at 47-48 (noting that 17 professional leagues other than Union Association and
American Association were formed during decade).
62. Id. at 47; SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 137.
63. RADER, supra note 21, at 47. The CHICAGO TRIBUNE dubbed the American
Association the " 'Beer Ball League.'" Id. Brewery owners sat on the boards of
directors for six Association teams. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 48.
66. See SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 144 (citing League President
Mills' belief that settlement was necessary to financially stabilize National League).
67. RADER, supra note 21, at 48.
68. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra note 21, at 146; see also RADER, supra note 21,
at 48 (noting that agreement guaranteed "mutual recognition of reserved players
and the establishment of exclusive territorial rights").
69. "Organized Baseball" is a term which refers to a group of professional
leagues allied under a series of National Agreements, the historical analogues of
the present-day Major League Agreement between the National and American
Leagues. "Professional Baseball" is a broader term than "Organized Baseball;" the
term "Organized Baseball" excludes those professional leagues which were not
part of the National Agreement.
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3. Interleague Battles, the Beginnings of Professional Player
Organizations, and the Enactment of the Sherman Act
Even after the signing of the National Agreement, Organized
Baseball was not immune to competition from competing leagues.
One of these competing leagues, the Union Association, was for-
mally organized in 1883.70 The Union Association was opposed to
the reserve system and, by logical extension, Organized Baseball. 71
In response to the threat posed by the Union Association, Organ-
ized Baseball passed measures which expelled any National Agree-
ment members who played against Union Association clubs. 72 In
addition, Organized Baseball prohibited member clubs from em-
ploying any reserved players who previously backed out of contracts
and went to the Union Association. 73 These measures did not pre-
vent the Union Association from taking the Northwestern League's
best players. 74 Despite its success in drawing players from Organ-
ized Baseball, the Union Association dissolved in 1884 due to a lack
of competitive balance among its members.
75
The reserve system caused some dissatisfaction among Organ-
ized Baseball's players, which in turn led to the formation of the
first union of professional baseball players, the National Brother-
hood of Professional Base Ball Players (Brotherhood). 76 Formed in
1885, the Brotherhood was organized as a fraternal group to pro-
mote the individual and collective interests of its members and to
promote the interests of the game.77 Brotherhood President John
Montgomery Ward spoke out against the one-sided nature of the
club/player bargaining process and criticized the reserve system.78
In 1887 three Brotherhood representatives met with League
officials and requested that salary figures be written into player con-
tracts and that the reserve system be eliminated. 79 Despite its de-
mands, the League declined to write salary figures into player
contracts.80 In addition, the Brotherhood was forced to back off its
70. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARs, supra note 21, at 148; see also RADER, supra note 21,
at 49-50 (describing Union Association founder Henry V. Lucas).
71. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 148.
72. Id. at 151.
73. Id. at 152.
74. Id. at 158.
75. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 159-60.
76. See id. at 222 (reprinting statement of dissatisfied player).
77. Id. at 221.
78. Id. at 222-23.
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demand to eliminate the reserve system because it could not pro-
pose any viable alternatives. 81 The League partially acquiesced,
however, by agreeing to incorporate the terms of the reserve rule
into player contracts.8 2
The 1887 settlement between the Brotherhood and the League
did not last long. During 1888, the owners adopted the Brush
Classification Plan.85 The Brush Plan grouped players by skill level
and paid them according to their level.84 The players threatened to
strike when the League rejected their request to repeal the classifi-
cation rule.8 5 The owners dismissed the strike threat as a ridiculous
whim.86
The players took action. Brotherhood representatives secretly
began organizing a new league by recruiting investors and players
to support their plans.8 7 On November 5, 1889, the Players' Na-
tional League of Base Ball Clubs (Players' League) was formally
started at a convention of approximately thirty-five players in New
York.88 Although the Players' League refused to adopt the reserve
and classification rules, players were still tied to their clubs for a
limited period of time and their salaries were frozen at their 1889
classification rule levels.89
The battle between the National League and the Players'
League, like the Union Association battle, focused on competition
for players. 90 The Players' League succeeded in winning over a ma-
jority of players.91 The National League attempted to win back its
players from the Players' League.92 When their attempts failed, the
81. Id. at 224.
82. Id. at 223.
83. The Brush Classification Plan was proposed by John T. Brush, owner of
the National League's Indianapolis club, at an owner's meeting in 1888. SEYMOUR,
EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 224. Under the Plan, managers and owners would
grade a player's personal conduct from the previous season. Id. at 129. This grade
determined the player's salary. Id. The best-behaved players were "Class A" players
and were paid $2500 per year; the worst-behaved players were "Class E" players and
were paid $1500 per year. Id.
84. Id. at 224.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 225.
87. See id. at 225-27 (describing actions taken by Brotherhood in starting new
league).
88. RADER, supra note 21, at 58-59; SEYMOUR, EAmv YEARs, supra note 21, at
228.
89. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 229.
90. Id. at 233.
91. Id.
92. Id. The League's efforts to reclaim personnel from the Union Association
included repealing the dassification rule and bribing players. Id.
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League went to the courts seeking injunctive relief to prevent Na-
tional League players from joining the Players' League. 93 The
courts generally refused to grant the requested injunctive relief.
94
The 1890 season was tough for both the Players' League and
Organized Baseball. 95 All three major leagues sustained financial
losses, and fans were disturbed by newspaper stories detailing in-
terleague squabbles.96 Peace negotiations between the Players'
League and Organized Baseball folded the Players' League and led
to the adoption of a new National Agreement in 1890.9 7 The new
Agreement created a National Board consisting of three members
with a chairperson. 98 One Board member represented each of the
three parties to the Agreement: the National League, the Ameri-
can Association, and the Western Association (a minor league).9
The Board was the ultimate authority on all issues ranging from the
approval of player contracts to the discipline of member clubs and
their players.100 In addition, the Agreement retained the reserve
system. 101
While the Players' League was being planned, Senator John
Sherman of Ohio was planning to play hardball with America's
powerful trusts and monopolies. In 1888 Senator Sherman intro-
duced legislation to destroy business combinations which had tradi-
93. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARs, supra note 21, at 235; see Comment, Organized Base-
ba! and the Law, 46 YALE LJ. 1386, 1387 n.3 (1937) (citing cases where courts
decided not to enforce contract).
94. SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra note 21, at 235; seeWeeghman v. Killifer, 215
F. 289, 295 (6th Cir. 1914) (denying preliminary injunction); Brooklyn Baseball
Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1902) (same). But see Cincinnati Exhi-
bition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269, 270 (E.D. Mo. 1914) (granting injunction against
player from playing with any other team until final resolution of case); Philadel-
phia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973, 976 (Pa. 1902) (finding player's contract
reasonable and reinstating plaintiff's case for trial).
Perhaps the most famous attempt to prevent a player from playing in the Play-
ers' League was the 1890 case of Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890). In Ward, the New York club sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin Brotherhood PresidentJohn Montgomery Ward from playing in the Play-
ers' League during the 1890 season. Id. The Supreme Court of New York refused
to grant the injunction because the issue could be resolved by trial before the start
of the 1890 playing schedule. Id. at 784.
95. See SEYMOUR, EARLY YEmts, supra note 21, at 239 (noting that all major
leagues were "drained" by financial losses).
96. Id. at 240. The three leagues were comprised of the National League, the
American Association, and the Players' League. Id.
97. Id. at 240-49.
98. Id. at 249.
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tionally been condemned under the common law as unlawful. 10 2
The bill was redrafted by the Senate Judiciary Committee after floor
debate.'03 Following a bicameral conference committee, the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee version of the bill was signed into law in
1890.104 Although there was little debate of the underlying eco-
nomic foundation supporting the Sherman Act,10 5 it is evident that
the scope of the Sherman Act is much broader than the original bill
submitted by Senator Sherman in 1888.106
Meanwhile, the adoption of the new National Agreement
ended the Players' League battle and laid the foundation for a dis-
pute between the American Association and the National
League. 10 7 Players who left Organized Baseball for the Players'
League were allowed to return to the clubs which had reserved
them for the 1889 season.108 However, the Philadelphia Athletics
(Athletics) of the American Association failed to reserve Louis
Bierbauer and Harry Stovey, two star players who had jumped to
the Players' League, for the 1891 season.10 9 The Pittsburgh Nation-
als seized this opportunity to sign Bierbauer. 10 In addition, Stovey
left the Association for the National League by signing with the Bos-
ton club. 1 The Athletics appealed to the National Board and
lost. 112 The Association President Allan W. Thurman cast his
National Board vote in favor of the National League on the
Bierbauer/Stovey issue." 3
Despite the Board's decision the Association clubs believed
that the National League had violated an implied agreement not to
102. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY
AND PROCEDURE 33 (3d ed. 1994).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Section one of the Sherman Act provides, "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
106. See SULLVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 102, at 35 (noting that Act is
more expansive than common law approach to restraints of trade).
107. RADER, supra note 21, at 61; SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra note 21, at 251.
108. RADER, supra note 21, at 61; SEYMOUR, EARLyYEARS, supra note 21, at 251.
109. RADER, supra note 21, at 61; SEMOUR, EARLvYEARs, supra note 21, at 251.
110. RADER, supra note 21, at 61; SEYMOUR, EARLYYEARS, supra note 21, at 251.
J. Palmer O'Neill, President of the Pittsburgh club, was nicknamed J. "Pirate"
O'Neill for signing Bierbauer. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 251. Ac-
cordingly, the Pittsburgh club was nicknamed the "Pirates." RADER, supra note 21,
at 61; SEYMOUR, EARLY YEAis, supra note 21, at 251.
111. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 251.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 252.
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negotiate with Bierbauer and Stovey.1 4 Angered by the loss of the
two players, and angered by Thurman's vote, the Association clubs
retaliated.' 15 Thurman was fired, and the Association formally
withdrew from the National Agreement.1 6 Further, the Associa-
tion launched plans to start a club in Cincinnati, which was a Na-
tional League city.117 The National Board stood its ground; since
the Association broke the reserve agreement, the Board declared
all Association players as possible acquisitions for National League
teams. I 1
8
In the wake of the Players' League battle, neither side was in a
position to absorb the financial losses which accompanied an in-
terleague battle. 119 The Association was especially incapable of
fighting the battle. 2 0 Internal divisions and poor gate receipts
placed the Association in financial trouble.' 21 The Association and
League owners recognized that the business of baseball would col-
lapse without a settlement. 22 Accordingly, a ten-year peace agree-
ment was negotiated between the leagues. 123 Four Association
clubs were combined with the eight League clubs to establish the
National League and American Association of Professional Base
Ball Clubs (National League).124
The National League was initially successful at regaining some
financial stability. However, the National League soon discovered
that things were not as good as they appeared. 25 Issues such as
gambling and gate receipts revealed differences between the own-
ers.126 Also, there was a lack of competitive balance among Na-
tional League teams, an issue which could not be addressed
because the peace agreement expressly indicated that there was to
be no change during the ten-year life of the agreement. 2
7 Ulti-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 252-53.




120. Id. at 257.
121. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 257.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 260-61.
124. Id. The remaining Association dubs were bought out. Id.
125. Id. at 293.
126. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEArs, supra note 21, at 294-96.
127. Id. at 299-300.
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mately, financial pressures forced the National League to buy out
four teams in 1899 and form an eight-team league.1 28
The problems which the National League faced during the
1890's left the League vulnerable to attack.'29 The attack came
from the Western League, a Midwest-based minor league led by
Ban Johnson, which was renamed the "American League" in
1899.130 After a profitable season in 1900, Johnson developed
plans to expand into the East, choosing not to apply for renewed
status as a "protected" minor league under the National Agree-
ment.13' The National League responded by awarding the Kansas
City and Minneapolis territories, both homes to American League
teams, to a new minor league.' 3 2 Johnson abandoned Minneapolis,
Kansas City and Indianapolis, moving the American League teams
into Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Boston. 33 This
move showed the American League's intent to become a major
league. 1
Like the previous interleague battles, the conflict between the
American and National Leagues was characterized by competition
for players.'35 The American League was successful at luring Na-
tional League players by offering salary increases and a chance to
get away from the "repressive" conditions of the National
League. 3 6 The American League ignored the reserve clause, and
the courts were generally reluctant to enforce the reserve clause.'
3 7
However, the biggest losers in the interleague competition for play-
ers were the minor leagues.' 38 The National League ignored the
National Agreement's provisions against contracting with minor
league players at a time when minor league teams party to the
Agreement desperately needed adherence to those provisions.
3 9
After two years of battling with the American League, the Na-
tional League owners did not want to face another unprofitable sea-
128. Id. at 305.
129. Id. at 306.
130. Id. at 308.
131. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 311.
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 313 (quoting statement of Ban Johnson).
135. See id. at 313-15 (describing "player-snatching" activity by American and
National Leagues).
136. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARs, supra note 21, at 314.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 315.
139. Id.
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son.14° American and National League officials met in Cincinnati
on January 9, 1903 and settled their differences. 141 After the meet-
ing, a new National Agreement was concluded, setting the founda-
tion for Organized Baseball as we experience it today. 142 Under the
1903 Agreement, both leagues were obligated to respect the reserve
rights of member clubs.143 A uniform contract for both leagues was
approved.144 A three-person National Commission was created to
govern the game, consisting of the two league presidents and a
chairperson.1 4 5 The minor leagues were party to the new Agree-
ment as well, receiving reserve rights in their players. 14
From 1903 to 1912 Organized Baseball faced several challenges
to its monopsonistic power over the business of baseball.1 47 Several
of these challenges were serious enough to require organized base-
ball's attention, such as the Pacific Coast, the Tri-State, and the
California State Leagues.148 Other leagues were feeble, short-lived
challenges, such as the Tidewater, the Atlantic, the Dixie and the
United States.
149
4. American League Baseball Club v. Chase
The 1914 case of American League Baseball Club v. Chase150 was
the first antitrust challenge brought against Organized Baseball.151
On March 26, 1914, Hal Chase executed the standard player's con-
tract with the Chicago club of the American League.1 52 Approxi-
mately three months later, Chase gave the Chicago club written
notice that he was cancelling the contract.153 On June 20, 1914,
Chase entered into a contract with the Buffalo club of the Federal
League. 154
140. Id. at 322.





146. SEYMOUR, EARLY YEARS, supra note 21, at 323.




150. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
151. GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 576. The term "Organized Baseball" refers
to the various leagues party to the National Agreement.
152. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 7-8.
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The Chicago club moved to obtain a preliminary injunction
preventing Chase from playing for any other club during the pe-
riod of the March 26 contract.1 55 The preliminary injunction was
granted, and Chase responded with a motion to dissolve the prelim-
inary injunction. 156 Chase challenged the injunction on the
grounds that the National Agreement and the rules and regulations
adopted by the National Commission pursuant to the Agreement
violated the Sherman Act.157
The first issue the Supreme Court of New York considered was
the threshold question for application of the Sherman Act:
whether Organized Baseball was engaged in interstate com-
merce. 158 Chase argued that the National Agreement established a
system under which players were commodities. 159 According to
Chase, baseball players were bought and sold across state lines by
various teams, thereby making baseball interstate commerce subject
to the Sherman Act. 160 The court rejected this argument, noting
that the focus of the National Agreement was the production of
baseball games and that such games were not commodities capable
of being transported across state lines.
161
The Chase court next addressed whether Organized Baseball
was an illegal combination or monopoly in violation of the com-
mon law. 162 The Supreme Court of New York ruled that Organized
Baseball violated the common law in three ways: first, it en-
croached upon the right to labor; second, it encroached upon the
right to contract; and third, it combined to restrain and control the
exercise of a profession. 65 Accordingly, the court granted Chase's
motion to vacate the preliminary injunction based upon the com-
mon law violations.164
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id.
157. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 15-16.
158. Id. at 16.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. According to the court, baseball was not a product to be mer-
chandized, and was therefore outside the province of the federal antitrust laws. Id.
at 16-17.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 17.
164. Id. at 20.
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5. The Federal League
The Federal League was formed in 1913.165 The Federal
League was a corporation consisting of several member clubs. 66
Each of the club owners held ten shares of stock at $100 per
share. 167 Since the American and National Leagues were making
record-setting profits, Federal League President James A. Gilmore
had no trouble assembling wealthy capitalists to support the
League. 168 By 1915, the Federal League was a direct competitor of
Organized Baseball in several cities.' 69 The Federal League had
clubs in Baltimore, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleve-
land, Newark, Pittsburgh and St. Louis.170 At its inception, the Fed-
eral League honored player contracts with Organized Baseball but
refused to honor the reserve clause.
171
Initially, Organized Baseball was not concerned about the de-
velopment of the Federal League.' 72 However, two events caused
Organized Baseball to worry about the Federal League. 173 First,
star shortstop Joe Tinker left Organized Baseball and went to the
Federal League. 174 Second, the Federal League announced that it
would bring an antitrust action against Organized Baseball. 175 The
Federal League and Organized Baseball stopped honoring each
other's contracts.' 76 The practice of "player-raiding" took on a nas-
tier tone than it had in previous interleague battles. 177 As a result,
the courts were frequently asked to settle contractual disputes be-
tween the leagues. 178
165. SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra note 147, at 199.
166. Id. at 200.
167. Id. Federal League rules required each team to post a $25,000 guarantee
and to give the League the lease to its ball park. Id. If the team owned its park, the
rules required that ownership rights be given to the League. Id. These measures
were intended to protect league stability. Id.
168. Id. Federal League backers included Harry Sinclair, the oil tycoon of
"Teapot Dome" fame, and the Ward brothers, owners of Ward's Bakery Company
in Brooklyn. Id.
169. SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra note 147, at 200.
170. See id. (describing 1914 expansion of Federal League from six to eight
teams).
171. Id. at 201.
172. Id. at 199-200.
173. Id.
174. SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra note 147, at 199-200.
175. Id. at 202-03.
176. Id. at 205.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 203-10 (providing historical background for the Kilifer case and
related cases). Organized Baseball learned its lesson from the Brotherhood and
American League battles; instead of going to court to enforce the reserve clause,
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The Federal League kept its promise to bring an antitrust ac-
tion against Organized Baseball. 179 In January, 1915, the Federal
League filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of sections one and
two of the Sherman Act.180 Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who
later became the first Commissioner of Organized Baseball, took
the case under advisement for a year.181
Judge Landis' favoritism towards Organized Baseball was a bad
omen for the Federal League. The Federal League soon discovered
the difficulty of competing with Organized Baseball. As the novelty
of the Federal League wore off, attendance dropped at League
games. 182 Since the Federal League had no minor league affilia-
tions, the Federal clubs were forced to carry approximately thirty
players per team and the increased salary expense associated with a
large roster.183 With the death of Robert Ward, one of the Federal
League's most significant financial backers, in October, 1915,184 all
financial "indicators" pointed toward a settlement.
Shortly after Ward's death, the competing leagues settled their
battle in Cincinnati on December 22, 1917.185 The antitrust suit
before Judge Landis was dismissed with the consent of both the
Federal League and Organized Baseball.18 6 Under the settlement
agreement, Organized Baseball paid $600,000 to dissolve the Fed-
eral League.18 7 Two Federal League clubs were merged into Or-
ganized Baseball by allowing Federal Club ownership groups to
purchase the Chicago Nationals and the St. Louis Americans.188
clubs only brought actions for breach of contract occurring during the term of the
agreement. Id. at 211.
179. SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra note 147, at 212.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 231.
183. Id. at 222.
184. SEYMOUR, GOLDEN AGE, supra note 147, at 230.
185. Id. at 231.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 232. Charles Weeghman and the Chicago ownership group of the
Federal League were allowed to purchase the Chicago Nationals. Id. Phil Ball and
the St. Louis ownership group of the Federal League were allowed to purchase the
St. Louis Americans. Id. The National League gave the Chicago ownership group
$50,000 toward the purchase price of the club. Id.
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B. First Base: Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs
Baltimore was the only Federal League member which refused
to join the settlement agreement.189 The Baltimore club brought
legal action under the Sherman Act against the National and Amer-
ican Leagues.190 The Baltimore club alleged that the disbandment
of the Federal League and its consequent injury to the Baltimore
club constituted a violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.191 Baltimore also alleged that the National Agreement 192 pro-
duced the reserve clause system, 193 a contractual mechanism which
violated the Sherman Act. 194
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that the business of providing exhibition baseball games
was a "sport" and not "trade" or "commerce" for Sherman Act pur-
poses.1 95 The test for interstate commerce which the Court of Ap-
peals applied was whether a good was being imported from one
state to another.1 96 Using this test, the court concluded that a
game of baseball is an exhibition which cannot be transferred
across state lines. 197
Since the restrictions imposed by the reserve system did not
directly affect the movement of the Baltimore club in interstate
commerce, the Court of Appeals held there was no Sherman Act
189. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 683. The National Agreement of 1883 linked the major leagues
(the National League and American Association) with a number of minor leagues.
Id. In 1903, the Agreement was "renewed" when the American League became a
party to the Agreement. Under the Agreement, minor league players had to enter
into a contract containing a reserve clause before they could be employed by any
member major league club. Id. Baltimore alleged that these contracts enabled the
National and American Leagues to control the market for players with major-
league skills, causing the demise of the Federal League and its individual clubs. Id.
193. Edward G. Coleman, Note, 24 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 372, 374 (1949). The
reserve clause was part of the standard baseball contract offered to players under
the rules and regulations of the National Agreement. Id. For a discussion of the
reserve system, see supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
194. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball, Inc.,
269 F. at 683.
195. Id. at 684. The Court of Appeals concluded that the test of interstate
commerce was importation of goods from one state to another. Id. The court also
concluded that a game of baseball is an exhibition which cannot be transferred
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violation. 198 The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the business
of giving exhibitions of baseball was intrastate in character. 199 The
Court also noted that the transport of equipment and players across
state lines by the National and American Leagues did not transform
the exhibitions into interstate commerce.
2 00
In short, the Federal Baseball holding extends only to a particu-
lar business at a particular time - the business of exhibition base-
ball as it existed in 1922 - and was not intended to extend
further. 20 1 The implication of the Federal Baseball Court's reasoning
is that Organized Baseball would be subject to Sherman Act scru-
tiny if a record were established showing that it was engaged in in-
terstate commerce. 2 02 The Federal Baseball decision involved a
mixed question of law and fact: whether the facts associated with
the particular industry (professional baseball) indicated that such a
business was engaged in interstate trade or commerce for Sherman
Act purposes.
2 0 3
The Federal Baseball ruling was consistent with prior decisions of
the Court which refused to extend the definition of "trade" or
"commerce" under the Sherman Act to include purely intrastate
activities.2 0 4 In the 1895 case of United States v. E.C. Knight
198. Id. at 688. The court observed that the reserve system was intended to
contribute to competitive equality among baseball teams by evenly distributing tal-
ent, making the game attractive to fans and, by extension, making clubs profitable.
Id.
199. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
200. Id. at 209.
201. See id. at 208-09. This analysis is confirmed by the following hypotheti-
cal. Change the factual record in Federal Baseball and suppose professional baseball
decided to expand into the manufacturing industry by producing toy dolls of Babe
Ruth, Ty Cobb and other baseball heroes. If the plant producing such dolls was
located in the state of New York, professional baseball shipped the dolls across
state lines to consumers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the profits from toy
doll sales exceeded the profits from giving exhibitions of baseball, we arguably
have a scenario where the Federal Baseball Court would be inclined to subject pro-
fessional baseball to Sherman Act scrutiny, at least with regard to its business activi-
ties in the manufacturing sphere. See National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club, Inc., 269 F. at 684-85. Therefore, examining the
Federal Baseball reasoning, since the Court did not foreclose professional baseball
from antitrust scrutiny, it is difficult to derive support from Federal Baseball for an
antitrust exemption based upon notions that baseball is "different" from other
industries.
202. See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball
Club, Inc., 269 F. at 684-85.
203. See id.
204. See also Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges and Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S,
965 (1970) (holding that non-commercial aspects of education are not subject to
antitrust scrutiny).
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Co.,205 the Court considered whether sale contracts for four sugar
refineries in Pennsylvania violated section one of the Sherman
Act.2 0 6 The Court distinguished between manufacturing and com-
mercial activity;20 7 the Court stated that "the contracts and acts of
the defendants related exclusively to the acquisition of the Philadel-
phia refineries and the business of sugar refining in Pennsylvania,
and bore no direct relation to commerce between the states or with
foreign nations."208 Therefore, the Court concluded that the con-
tracts did not violate section one of the Act.
20 9
C. From First Base to Second Base: The Years Between the
Federal Baseball and Toolson Rulings, 1922-1953
From 1922 to 1953, professional baseball changed in several
significant ways. Radio coverage of professional baseball became
popular following World War 11.210 Organized Baseball began
sponsoring interstate advertising.2 1' Technological advancements
enabled fans to travel across state lines to watch games.212 In 1947,
Jackie Robinson became the first African-American to play major
league baseball.
213
Changes in professional baseball paralleled a shift in the
Court's definition of interstate commerce.2 14 In 1942, the Court
205. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
206. Id. at 2-3. The contracts at issue gave the American Sugar Refining Com-
pany, a NewJersey corporation, "nearly complete control of the manufacturing of
refined sugar within the United States." Id. at 9.
207. Id. at 13-16.
208. Id. at 17.
209. Id.
210. RADER, supra note 21, at 160. During the late 1940's "the number of
locally operated AM radio stations doubled." Id. Radio broadcasters became
household names, such as the Yankees' Mel Allen, the Cardinals' Harry Caray, and
Brooklyn's Red Barber. Id. Live play-by-play of "away" games did not catch on
until the mid-1950's, however; before 1950, the majority of "away" game broadcasts
were "re-creations." See id.
211. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 358 (1953) (Burton,
J., dissenting) (noting facts indicating professional baseball was engaged in inter-
state commerce).
212. Id.
213. RADER, supra note 21, at 151. Prior to becoming a professional baseball
player, Robinson was an Army officer during World War II and a five-sport star at
UCLA (basketball, football, golf, swimming and track). Id. He won the Rookie of
the Year Award in 1947. Id.
214. SeeJohn S. Lockman, Note, Baseball as Interstate Commerce Within the Mean-
ing of the Antitrust Laws, 5 INTRAMURAL L. REv. 206, 212 (1950) (noting Court's
expanded interpretation of Commerce Clause); John J. McQuaide, Note, Curt
Flood at Bat Against Baseball's "Reserve Clause," 8 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 92, 95 (1971)
(observing that criteria of interstate commerce used in Federal Baseball were obso-
lete by late 1940's).
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held in Wickard v. Filburn ' 5 that the activity of growing wheat for
intrastate consumption may be subject to federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause if the activity "exacts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce."216 In determining whether the ac-
tivity exacts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,
the Court concluded that the distinction between "direct" and "in-
direct" effects was irrelevant.21 7 This conclusion contradicted the
analysis supporting the Federal Baseball ruling, which indicated that
the distinction between direct and indirect effects was outcome-de-
terminative in evaluating whether the Sherman Act applied in a
particular case. 2
18
Despite the apparent shift in the Court's definition of inter-
state commerce, lower courts approved the Federal Baseball ruling.2 1 9
In the 1922 case of Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange,220 the
Court refused to affirm the trial court's dismissal of a Sherman Act
claim against a vaudeville performance group.2 1 The Court rea-
soned that, after Federal Baseball, the question of whether the Sher-
man Act applied to a particular business was a mixed question of
law and fact and remanded the case.22 2 Therefore, the lower court
had to consider the facts associated with the business under review
in deciding the issue ofjurisdiction. 223 Similarly, in the 1949 case
of Martin v. National League Baseball Club,224 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted Federal Baseball as
directing a reviewing court to consider "the proportion of the inter-
state activities [of the business under review] to the whole busi-
ness."225 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the "bare"
allegation that Organized Baseball contracted with broadcast-
215. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
216. Id. at 124;John W. Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 FoRDHAm L.
REv. 208, 217 (1947).
217. Wwkard, 317 U.S. at 124.
218. See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball
Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (noting that there must be direct
effect on interstate commerce for Sherman Act to apply), aftd, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
219. But see Niemiec v. Seattle Ranier Baseball Club, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 705, 712
(W.D. Wash. 1946) (suggesting that shift in Court's definition of interstate com-
merce may be a basis for reversing Federal Baseball).
220. 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
221. Id. at 274.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949).
225. Id. at 918.
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ing companies was not enough to maintain a Sherman Act
challenge.2
6
D. Second Base: Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.
In 1951, the Newark International Club assigned George Earl
Toolson's contract to the Binghampton Exhibition Company, but
Toolson refused to report to Binghampton.22 7 Pursuant to his con-
tract and the rules of Organized Baseball, Toolson was put on the
ineligible list of the Binghampton team and was not allowed to play
professional baseball.2 8 Toolson brought an action under the
Sherman Act, alleging that the New York Yankees and the minor
league clubs party to the action constituted a monopoly which pre-
vented him from playing baseball.
22
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Toolson Court did not re-examine the rationale supporting the Fed-
eral Baseball decision.2 0 The Court noted that the business of base-
ball had developed for thirty years on the assumption that it was
exempt from the Sherman Act,2 3 ' and that Congress had not re-
moved the exemption during this period.
232
Justice Burton, joined by Justice Reed, dissented. Justice Bur-
ton believed that professional baseball was clearly engaged in inter-
226. Id.
227. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
This assignment was the baseball equivalent of a demotion; in effect, Toolson was
being "demoted" from one minor league club to another dub within the Yankees'
system.
228. Tooson, 101 F. Supp. at 93.
229. Id.
230. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
231. Id. The Court concluded:
Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below
are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs... so far as that decision deter-
mines that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Id.
An interesting question raised by this holding is: did the Federal Baseball Court
determine whether Congress intended to subject professional baseball to antitrust
scrutiny? While the Toolson decision seems to suggest that such a determination
was made, the Federal Baseball opinion suggests otherwise. McQuaide, supra note
214, at 96; see Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1922).
232. See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, Inc., 259 U.S. at 207-09.
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state commerce.233 According to Justice Burton, the Federal Baseball
Court did not state that professional baseball was exempt from the
Sherman Act regardless of whether the business was engaged in in-
terstate commerce.23 4 Rather, the Hart Court indicated that profes-
sional baseball may be subject to the Sherman Act if the "incidental
features" of professional baseball grew to the point where they were
no longer incidental. 235
E. From Second Base to Third Base: The Years Between the
Toolson and Flood Rulings, 1953-1972
On the eve of the Flood decision, professional baseball barely
resembled the business reviewed in Federal Baseball. The business of
baseball continued to change between 1953 and 1972. Franchise
relocations occurred frequently.23 6 Television coverage of major
league games attracted a large audience during the late 1950's.237
Under the leadership of Marvin Miller, the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) became an important player in labor
issues.23
8
After Toolson, the Supreme Court refused to extend the Federal
Baseball reasoning to other professional activities and sports.23 9 In
United States v. Shubert,240 the Court was asked to extend the Federal
Baseball holding to the business of theatrical productions.2 41 The
Court refused to extend antitrust protection to professional theatri-
cal productions, noting that Federal Baseball, Hart and Toolson to-
gether indicated that the exemption was limited to the business of
baseball.2 42 In 1957, the Court refused to extend the Federal Baseball
holding to professional football.243 The Radovich Court employed
233. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting).
234. Id. (Burton, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 360-61 (citing Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S.
271, 274 (1923)).
236. RADER, supra note 21, at 172 (observing that teams moved during 1950's
and 1960's "to exploit the new population centers").
237. See id. at 176-77 (describing CBS team of Dizzy Dean and Buddy
Blattner).
238. Id. at 186.
239. See Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (noting that profes-
sional basketball is not exempt from antitrust laws); United States v. International
Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1955) (noting that professional boxing is not
exempt from antitrust laws).
240. 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
241. Id. at 227.
242. Id. at 228-230.
243. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1957).
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the same reasoning used in Shubert: Toolson restricted the Federal
Baseball ruling to professional baseball.
244
While stopping short of endorsing the exemption, the United
States Courts of Appeals deferred to the Supreme Court's rulings
on the exemption. In Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball
Club, Inc., 245 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted Toolson and Radovich as indicating that any altera-
tion of the exemption should be done by Congress. 24 6
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit was not certain that the Court was "ready" to overrule the ex-
emption in 1970.247 Accordingly, in Salerno v. American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that the business of professional baseball was
exempt from the antitrust laws.
24
F. Third Base: Flood v. Kuhn
In October, 1969, Curt Flood, a thirty-one year-old
centerfielder with the St. Louis Cardinals, was traded to the Phila-
delphia Phillies.249 Displeased with the trade, Flood complained to
the Commissioner's office in December, 1969, asking the Commis-
sioner to make him a free agent.250 Commissioner Kuhn denied
Flood's request.2 5 1 Flood brought an antitrust action against Kuhn
challenging the legality of baseball's reserve system.252 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
baseball's reserve system was shielded from antitrust scrutiny by
baseball's exemption.255 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's determination, not-
ing that the exemption issue was properly reserved to Congress.2 54
244. Id. at 451.
245. 282 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960).
246. Id.
247. Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d
1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
248. Id.
249. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. Flood was supported by the MLBPA in bringing his antitrust claim.
Id. n.7.
253. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
254. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore,J., concurring),
aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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The United States Supreme Court reviewed the common law
history of the exemption and the history of congressional activity
on the exemption issue.255 After reviewing the common law and
congressional activity regarding the exemption, the Court per-
formed an informal stare decisis analysis of the exemption issue.2
56
The Court recognized that the underlying reasoning of the Federal
Baseball ruling was invalid because professional baseball was en-
gaged in interstate commerce.2 57 The Court balanced the fact that
the Federal Baseball ruling was outdated against baseball's reliance
interest in the exemption.258 The Court concluded that baseball's
reliance interest was more significant.2 59
Like the Toolson Court, the Flood Court concluded that congres-
sional "silence" on the exemption issue indicated congressional ap-
proval of the exemption.2 60 The Flood Court also noted that the
Supreme Court had consistently observed that any alteration of the
exemption should be done by Congress.2 61 Accordingly, the Flood
Court followed Too/son.262 The Supreme Court dismissed Flood's
state antitrust law claims for two reasons: first, state law conflicted
with federal policy and regulation of professional baseball;2 63 and
second, state law is precluded by the Commerce Clause because the
burden state law places on interstate commerce is outweighed by
the state interest in regulating professional baseball.
264
255. The Court's review induded an examination of the Federal Basebal Hart,
Toolson, Shubert, International Boxing Club, Radovich and Haywood opinions. See Rood,
407 U.S. at 269-82.
256. See id. at 282-84 (enumerating eight conclusions which Court drew from
historical analysis).
257. Id. at 282.
258. See id. at 282 (noting that baseball's exemption was half-century old and
it had "survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce"); see also
Mark T. Gould, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch Gets Closer and Closer, 5 SE-
TON HALLJ. SPORT L. 273, 278 (noting that enormous amounts of capital had been
invested in reliance on professional baseball's antitrust exemption); McQuaide,
supra note 214, at 102 (discussing nature of baseball's reliance interest).
259. Rood, 407 U.S. at 284 (following Federal Baseball and Toolson).
260. Id. at 283-84; McQuaide, supra note 214, at 98.
261. Rood, 407 U.S. at 283; Lafferty, supra note 14, at 1277.
262. Food, 407 U.S. at 285 (citing Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356, 357 (1953)).
263. Id. at 284.
264. Id.; see also Baseball's Antitrust Immunity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrus Monopolies, and Bus. Rts. of the Comm on the Judiciay, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
160 (1992) (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director, MLBPA) (noting
that meaning of Federal Baseball had been completely reversed by dismissal of state
law claims in Rood) [hereinafter Baseballs Antitrust Immunity).
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III. FROM THIRD BASE TO HOME PLATE: A DESCRIPTION OF
BASEBALL'S THREE ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
During the post-Food years, the fact that the Supreme Court
has never clearly defined the scope of professional baseball's ex-
emption or the policies supporting professional baseball's exemp-
tion has haunted American courts. Today, professional baseball
has three antitrust exemptions primarily because the Toolson Court
failed to recognize the difference between an antitrust exclusion
and an antitrust exemption. As a result, the scope of baseball's anti-
trust exemption has become whatever the reviewing court says it is.
Since Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood do not provide any
helpful guidance as to the bounds of the exemption, courts decid-
ing the matter-of-law issue of whether the exemption applies in a
particular case are virtually unconstrained by precedent. Baseball's
three antitrust exemptions are the direct result of court attempts to
write a policy-grounded exemption into the Federal Baseball opinion.
The three exemptions are described below.
A. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn and the
"Whole Business" Exemption
In Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,265 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided whether baseball's anti-
trust exemption was limited to the reserve system. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
"[t]he Supreme Court has held three times that 'the business of
baseball' is exempt from the federal antitrust laws." 266 The court
examined language in the Federal Baseball Toolson, Flood and
Radovich cases and decided that, despite references in Flood to the
reserve system, the four opinions together indicate "that the
Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not
any particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust
laws." 267
The Finley exemption has limits. In a footnote, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that the exemption "does not apply wholesale
to all cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business
of baseball." 26 The court cited Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles
265. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978).
266. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 541.
267. Id. (footnote omitted).
268. Id. at 541 n.51.
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0. Finley & Co.269 (Twin City) as an example of a case where the
relation to the business of baseball was attenuated. Twin City was a
diversity action based on an alleged breach of a concession con-
tract.270 The Finley company purchased the Kansas City Athletics
and, after the 1967 season, moved the team to Oakland.27 1 The
defendant argued that the transfer of team ownership, the team's
relocation, and change of name to "Oakland Athletics" released the
defendant from the concession contract between Twin City and the
club, which was entered into eleven years prior to the team's sale
and relocation.272 The defendant impleaded the plaintiff's parent
corporation, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws. 273
Sitting by designation, Justice Clark identified the relevant
product market in Twin City as the market for the "supplying of
concession services to major league baseball"274 and did not discuss
the issue of whether the exemption applies in this context. There-
fore, in Finley the Seventh Circuit indicated that the "whole busi-
ness" exemption does not protect a concession service company
which contracts with professional baseball from antitrust scrutiny.
Aside from the Twin City example of what constitutes an attenuated
relation, the Seventh Circuit did not determine the precise mean-
ing of "the business of baseball."
B. Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the
"Reserve Clause and League Structure" Exemption
Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs involved a
female umpire's challenge to allegedly discriminatory conduct on
the basis of gender.275 In deciding whether Postema's state law re-
straint of trade claims were exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
reviewed the Toolson and Flood opinions, noting that Toolson did not
re-examine the legal foundation of Federal BasebalL276 Citing United
269. 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972), revd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264
(9th Cir. 1975).
270. Twin City Sportsemice, Inc., 365 F. Supp. at 237.
271. Id. at 238.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 241.
275. Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp.
1475, 1478-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
276. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1487-88.
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States v. Shubert, the district court observed that Toolson was "a nar-
row application of the doctrine of stare decisis."
277
The district court determined that the Flood Court rejected the
foundation of Federal Baseball by expressly recognizing that profes-
sional baseball was a business engaged in interstate commerce.2 7
8
The district court interpreted Flood as following Federal Baseball and
Toolson on stare decisis grounds, despite the Flood Court's recogni-
tion that professional baseball was engaged in interstate com-
merce.2 79 The district court interpreted Flood as precluding state
law antitrust claims where such claims would conflict with baseball's
federal antitrust exemption.2
80
After discussing the Supreme Court opinions, the Postema
court determined the exemption's scope. The district court con-
cluded that Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood considered the exemp-
tion in the "limited contexts" of baseball's reserve system and its
league structure.281 Relying primarily on State v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc.2 82 and Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n
283
(Henderson), the Postema court also concluded that "the exemption
does not provide baseball with blanket immunity for anti-competi-
tive behavior in every context in which it operates." 284
Borrowing language from Henderson, the Postema court consid-
ered whether professional baseball's employment relations with its
umpires are "central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the
277. Id. at 1487 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955))
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
278. Id. at 1487.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1488.
282. 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). The Milwaukee
Braves case involved the state of Wisconsin's challenge to the Braves' move to At-
lanta. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d at 2. The state argued that the Braves
had agreed with other major league teams to terminate play of major league base-
ball in Milwaukee, and that such an agreement violated Wisconsin antitrust law.
Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a decision "whether to admit a new
member [to the National League] in order to replace an existing member which
desired to move to a new area" was protected by professional baseball's antitrust
exemption from antitrust scrutiny under state law. Id. at 15. The court also held
that "the exemption at least covers the agreements and rules which provide for the
structure of the organization and the decisions which are necessary steps in main-
taining it." Id.
283. 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The Henderson Broadcasting Corp.
court considered the issue of whether the business of radio broadcasting was "so
much a part of baseball" that professional baseball's antitrust exemption extended
to that business. Id. at 268. The court answered the issue in the negative, noting
that the purpose of the exemption is "to protect the league structure." Id. at 267.
284. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
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baseball exemption."28 5 Relying on Food, the court found that such
employment relations are not a "unique characteristic or need" of
baseball.28 6 Therefore, Postema's claims were not preempted by
baseball's antitrust exemption.28 7 In summary, the Postema analysis
directs a reviewing court to use the flood "unique characteristics
and needs" language to determine whether a particular matter is
part of "league structure."
C. Piazza v. Major League Baseball and the
"Reserve System" Exemption
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recently defined the scope of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption in Piazza v. Major League BasebalL288 On August 6, 1992,
Vincent M. Piazza, Vincent M. Tirendi and four Florida residents
(Investors) signed a letter of intent with Robert Lurie, owner of the
San Francisco Giants, to purchase the Giants for $115 million.289
On August 18, the Investors agreed to organize a limited partner-
ship to purchase the Giants.2 90 The Investors executed a limited
partnership agreement on August 26, creating Tampa Bay Baseball
Club, Ltd. (Partnership).291 On September 4, pursuant to MLB
rules, the Partnership applied to MLB for permission to purchase
the Giants and move the team to St. Petersburg, Florida.2 92 That
same day, Fred Kuhlmann, a member of MLB's Ownership Com-
mittee, directed Lurie to consider other offers to purchase the
Giants.295
On September 9, National League President Bill White invited
George Shinn to make a bid to keep the Giants in San Francisco. 294
285. Id.; Henderson Broadcasting Cop., 541 F. Supp. at 265.
286. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
287. Id.
288. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For an interesting discussion of the
Piazza case, see Lisa DePaulo, Biting Back, PHILADELPHIA,July 1994, at 59; Charles P.
Pierce, Hardbal GENTLEMEN'S QUARmL.Y, May 1994, at 67.
289. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 422. Lurie agreed not to negotiate with other
potential buyers of the Giants and to use his best efforts to aid the Investors in
their application to MLB for ownership and transfer of the franchise. Id.
290. Id. The Investors anticipated that they would form individual corpora-
tions to serve as the general partners of the Partnership. Id.
291. Id. PT Baseball, Inc., a corporation owned by Piazza and Tirendi, was
the largest contributor of Partnership capital, contributing 27 million dollars. Id.
292. Id. Part of the application process is a "background check" on the Inves-
tors by MLB's Ownership Committee. Id.
293. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 423. Kuhlmann was allegedly aware of Lurie's
exclusive agreement with the Investors. Id.
294. Id.
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At a September 10 news conference, MLB Ownership Committee
members Kuhlmann and Jerry Reinsdorf expressed reservations
with the Partnership application, stating that Piazza and Tirendi
had dropped out of the Partnership. 295 On November 10, 1992,
MLB formally rejected the Partnership's application for ownership
of the Giants.2 96
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that MLB conspired to ex-
clude plaintiffs from the market for ownership of existing National
and American League teams in violation of the Sherman Act.2 9 7
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the busi-
ness of baseball was exempt from Act coverage. 298 The district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, interpreting Flood as narrowing
MLB's antitrust exemption to its reserve system.2 99
How did the Flood Court narrow the exemption? The Piazza
court conceded that, prior to the Flood ruling, the "business of base-
ball" may have been exempt from the Sherman Act.3 0 0 However,
the Flood Court narrowed the scope of the exemption by limiting
the precedential value of Federal Baseball and Toolson to the reserve
system.301 The Piazza court interpreted Flod as employing a "two-
prong" approach in limiting the exemption's scope.30 2 First, the
Food Court rejected the Federal Baseball reasoning by recognizing
that professional baseball was a business engaged in interstate com-
merce.303 Second, the Rood Court justified "the continued prece-
dential value of the result of [Federal Baseball]," noting that
"continued positive congressional inaction and concerns over retro-
activity" were factors supporting a limited antitrust exemption.30 4
295. Id. at 422. On September 10, 1992, Kuhlmann stated that there was a
background question regarding two of the Investors and that the money of those
two Investors would not be accepted. Id. Reinsdorf stated that the background
question related to the "out-of-state" money and that the Pennsylvania Investors
had dropped out. Id. Piazza and Tirendi, as owners of PT Baseball, Inc., were the
only members of the Partnership from Pennsylvania. Id.
296. Id.
297. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 423-24.
298. Id. at 429.
299. Id. at 436. ContraJulie Dorst, Comment, Franchise Relocations: Reconsider-
ing Major League Baseball's Carte Blanche Control, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS L. 553, 593
(1994) (contending Piazza court held that Sherman Act applies to reserve clause).
300. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 435-36.
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In Piazza, the district court asserted that it was not obliged to
follow the reasoning of Federal Baseball or Toolson.305 The court dis-
tinguished between two types of stare decisis: "rule" stare decisis
and "result" stare decisis. 30 6 The American system of precedent is
based on rule stare decisis, a principle which requires a court to
adhere to the reasoning and the result of a controlling case.307 The
English system of precedent is based on result stare decisis, a princi-
ple which requires a court to follow the result of a case which is "on
point."
308
According to the Piazza court, Flood created a result stare deci-
sis situation by recognizing that professional baseball was engaged
in interstate commerce. 30° Therefore, the Piazza court determined
that no rule binds lower courts determining whether baseball's anti-
trust exemption applies in a particular case.310 After Flood, the re-
serve system was the only remaining exempt restraint on interstate
commerce.311 In short, Piazza directs a reviewing court to deter-
mine whether the matter at issue involves an antitrust challenge to
professional baseball's reserve system. If the reserve system is being
challenged, the exemption applies.312
IV. THE IRONY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE
EXEMPTION ISSUE
From 1952 to 1995 Congress has held numerous hearings on
the issue of baseball's antitrust status.313 These hearings were fre-
quently accompanied by efforts to alter baseball's antitrust status,
ranging from legislation designed to exempt all professional sports
from antitrust scrutiny to legislation which eliminated baseball's
305. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
306. Id. at 437-38 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 692 (3d
Cir. 1991), aff'd inpart and rev'd inpart on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see
Lafferty, supra note 14, at 1287-88 (discussing rule stare decisis and result stare
decisis).
307. Planned Parenthood, 947 F.2d at 692.
308. Id.
309. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. In dicta, the Piazza court indicated that, even if its analysis was incorrect,
the "expansive version of the Federal Baseball exemption" (the "business of baseball"
exemption) applies only to a particular product market: the market for the exhibi-
tion of baseball games. Id. at 439-40. Therefore, if Piazza established that the rele-
vant product market was the market for purchase of existing major league baseball
teams, the court argued that the exemption would not protect MLB's conduct
from antitrust scrutiny. Id.
313. See, e.g., Baseball's Antitrust Immunity, supra note 264.
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special antitrust status.3 14 At the hearings, various arguments were
made in support of and against baseball's antitrust protection.
315
Ironically, congressional action has only led to congressional inac-
tion. Congress has never enacted legislation altering baseball's an-
titrust status as defined by the courts.
Congressional "silence" has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as tacit approval of baseball's common law antitrust protec-
tion.3 16 However, the notion that congressional intent can be in-
ferred from congressional inactivity is troublesome.3 17 Many valid
inferences are possible from congressional inactivity on the exemp-
tion issue.318 For example, suppose that congressional inaction
means that Congress is united in its desire to remove baseball's ex-
emption but cannot reach a consensus as to the way to remove it.
Consider the possibility that congressional inaction indicates some
members of Congress want to narrow the exemption and other
members of Congress want to extend antitrust protection to all pro-
fessional sports. The two aforementioned inferences are no less
correct than the inference adopted by the Court in Toolson and
Food.
If we assume that the Toolson and Flood Courts upheld a broad
exemption from the antitrust laws (complete antitrust immunity or
something close to it), then deriving congressional intent from con-
gressional inaction was particularly unjustified in the context of
those cases. Historical evidence indicates that Congress believed
that professional baseball was subject to the antitrust laws.319 In
1952, the House Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power re-
ported unfavorably on several bills which would have extended
complete antitrust immunity to professional baseball:
314. See, e.g., S. 2401, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (creating a National Com-
mission to govern professional baseball); S. 500, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(amending Clayton Act to make antitrust laws applicable to professional baseball).
315. See Baseball's Antitrust Immunity, supra note 264, at 365 (statement of
Roger G. Noll, Morris M. Doyle Professor, Stanford University) (arguing that re-
moving exemption would not solve problem of franchise scarcity); id. at 54 (state-
ment of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (arguing that antitrust protection for league
decisions regarding purchase and sale of franchises promotes franchise stability).
316. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (refusing to withdraw
from Toolson conclusion that congressional inaction indicates approval of exemp-
tion); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (noting that
Congress refused to alter exemption during 30 years following Federal Baseball).
317. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-120 (1940) (arguing that ex-
plaining the cause of inaction by Congress without evidence is unjustified); Neary,
supra note 13, at 891 (discussing possible reasons for congressional inaction).
318. Neary, supra note 13, at 891.
319. Id. at 892.
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[B]efore recommending a carte blanche immunity [for
professional baseball], this subcommittee would have to
place its stamp of approval on every aspect of the game as
now conducted. The subcommittee would thus be approv-
ing important practices which representatives of organ-
ized baseball have themselves condemned .... If a blanket
immunity were granted, all appeal to the courts from a
possibly arbitrary decision by the rulers of professional
baseball would be foreclosed. In the past the reserve
clause has been employed as a "war measure" to right the
development of competing leagues, sometimes at the ex-
pense of individual players. Although instances of arbi-
trary exercise of power have been rare, they have occurred
in the past. The possibility, however remote, that power
will be misused in the future makes it unwise perpetually
to preclude resort to the courts in such cases.320
This evidence undercuts the Court's basis for deriving congres-
sional intent from congressional inaction. Regardless of whether
the House Subcommittee had an accurate understanding of the
scope of baseball's antitrust exemption in 1952, the report demon-
strates that Congress contemplated antitrust review of the conduct
of Organized Baseball.3 21
V. AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE THREE EXEMPTIONS
In dicta, the Piazza court noted that, even if the exemption was
not limited to the reserve clause, the exemption applies only to a
particular market - "the market comprised of baseball exhibi-
tions."32 2 This observation raises the issue of whether the semantic
differences captured in the Finley, Postema and Piazza opinions are
capable of precise antitrust translation. What types of relationships
are covered by baseball's three exemptions? What kind of conduct
is covered by the three exemptions? Is the Piazza court correct in
characterizing the exemption as being limited to a particular mar-
ket? In this section of the Article, the three exemptions in the anti-
trust context will be considered.
320. H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1952).
321. A variation of this argument was made by counsel for the plaintiff in
Piazza. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint at 28-30, Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp.
420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (No. 92-CV-7173). The court did not address this argument in
its opinion.
322. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 439-40 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
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Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combina-
tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade.323 A plaintiff in a pri-
vate antitrust action "must demonstrate a causal connection among
the following: (1) injury suffered, (2) to business or property, by
(3) the violation of an antitrust law."3 2 4 More specifically, in order
to establish a prima facie case under section one, a plaintiff must
show: first, a contract, combination or conspiracy; second, a re-
straint of trade; and third, injury to competition in a relevant prod-
uct market.
3 2 5
When considering antitrust claims under section one of the
Sherman Act, a court must characterize challenged restraints to de-
termine which antitrust principles govern its analysis. Once a court
determines that there is a contract, combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade, the court characterizes the alleged conduct.
32 6 If
the court characterizes the alleged conduct as being "clearly an-
ticompetitive," such as price fixing, it can be "conclusively pre-
sumed illegal without any further inquiry."32 7 However, if the
challenged conduct is not characterized as being inherently an-
ticompetitive, the court will determine whether the conduct "has an
unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect."328 In making this de-
termination, the court will engage in a rule of reason analysis,
which involves a "detailed factual inquiry which will scrutinize the
purpose and the effect of the practice and reasonable inferences
derived therefrom."329 If the court finds that the conduct has an
unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect, the conduct violates sec-
tion one.
3 3 0
A. The Supreme Court Trilogy
Federal Baseball involved two antitrust challenges under section
one of the Sherman Act.3 3 ' The first challenge was to the National
323. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the text of section one, see
supra note 105 and accompanying text.
324. SULLVAN & HovENIKAMp, supra note 102, at 80 (citing Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
325. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. den/d, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
326. See SULLIVAN & HovENKAmp, supra note 102, at 184-85.
327. Mid-South Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 565 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)); SULLIVAN & HoVENKAMP, supra note 102, at 185.
328. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 102, at 185 (emphasis in original).
329. Id; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (outlining relevant factors in rule of reason analysis).
330. See SULLIVAN & HovENcAMP, supra note 102, at 185.
331. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
1995]
39
McMahon: A History and Analysis of Baseball's Three Antitrust Exemptions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
252 ViLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
Agreement.33 2 The second challenge was to the reserve system,
which was part of the National Agreement.333 The trial court
charged the jury to determine whether Organized Baseball con-
spired to destroy the Federal League.33 4 On appeal, the Federal
Baseball Court held that a particular business (the business of exhib-
iting baseball games) was not subject to scrutiny under the Sher-
man Act because the business was not "trade" or "commerce."33 5 By
holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to the business of exhi-
bition baseball, the Federal Baseball Court effectively held that the
Sherman Act did not apply to any business entity devoted exclu-
sively to the business of exhibiting baseball games.336
The agreements challenged in Federal Baseball were intraleague
and interleague agreements which established the reserve sys-
tem.3 3 7 The reserve system prevented players under contract with
National Agreement teams from moving to a competing league.338
The reserve system gave Organized Baseball "control over practi-
cally all available players of sufficient skill to serve in a major league
club."33 9 Therefore, the reserve system was the mechanism by
which Organized Baseball attempted to prevent entry by competi-
tors into the market for exhibiting baseball games and a means to
eliminate existing competitors. 34°
In sum, the reserve system agreements analyzed by the Federal
Baseball Court were agreements between leagues which can be
loosely classified as group boycotts. There is no indication that the
Federal Baseball Court limited its analysis to a particular product mar-
ket. Rather, the Federal Baseball analysis was limited to a particular
industry which was engaged in several product markets - for ex-
ample, the market for sale and purchase of baseball equipment and




334. Id. at 684.
335. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
336. Id. at 209.
337. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club,
Inc., 269 F. at 683.
338. For an explanation of how the reserve system works, see infra notes 51-69
and accompanying text.
339. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club,
Inc., 269 F. at 683.
340. Id.
341. See id.
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Like Federal Baseball, the Toolson and Flood cases stemmed from
challenges to the interleague and intraleague agreements which es-
tablished baseball's reserve system.342 Since Toolson and Flood were
both decided as a matter of law on stare decisis grounds, both opin-
ions add little (if anything) to understanding the antitrust contours
of the exemption. Therefore, after Flood it is reasonable to assume
that the American and National Leagues can implement the reserve
system without being subject to antitrust scrutiny3 43 The precise
holdings of Federal Baseball, Toolson and Flood differ, but all three
opinions state that professional baseball was either not covered by
the language of the Sherman Act or was exempt from the statute
for policy reasons, regardless of how the product market was
defined.
344
B. The Three Exemptions
The Finley court examined whether a decision by the Commis-
sioner of MLB to disapprove player trades under the Commis-
sioner's "best interests of baseball" authority was an illegal restraint
of trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 4 5 The
Seventh Circuit decided that the exemption protected the Commis-
sioner's decision from antitrust scrutiny.34 Therefore, the Finley re-
sult indicates that decisions by the Commissioner regarding player
trades under the Commissioner's "best interests of baseball" author-
ity are exempt from antitrust scrutiny3 47 By holding that the busi-
ness of baseball was exempt from the Sherman Act, the Seventh
Circuit suggested that MLB escapes antitrust scrutiny regardless of
how the alleged trade restraint is characterized and regardless of
how the product market is defined.3 48
The Postema court considered a female umpire's common law
restraint-of-trade claim stemming from her discharge and subse-
342. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265-67 (1972); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd per curia, 200 F.2d 198 (9th
Cir. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
343. See FRood, 407 U.S. at 285; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
344. ood, 407 U.S. at 285; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Federal Baseball Club,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
345. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denie, 439
U.S. 876 (1978).
346. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 541 (holding entire business of base-
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quent inability to obtain ajob as a major league baseball umpire3 49
The court concluded that the exemption did not apply to "base-
ball's relations with non-players."35 0 Accordingly, Postema was al-
lowed to pursue her common law claim.351 The Postema analysis
indicates that the issue of whether alleged anticompetitive conduct
is covered by the exemption is a matter-of-law determination for the
court.3 52 While the Postema court did not use clear guidelines in
making the matter-of-law determination, the court indicated that
the context of the anticompetitive conduct is crucial in determin-
ing whether the exemption applies.353
The Piazza court considered a challenge to an allegedly arbi-
trary decision by MLB to deny an investor group permission to
purchase the San Francisco Giants. 35 4 The Piazza court held that
the antitrust exemption was limited to a particular restraint of
trade: the reserve clause.3 55 The Piazza court suggested that the
exemption was limited to the reserve clause regardless of the identi-
fied product market.
3 56
In dicta, the Piazza court indicated that its narrow construction
of the exemption might be rejected on appeal.3 57 Accordingly, the
Piazza court offered an alternative argument in support of its con-
clusion. The Piazza court contended that it was irrelevant whether
or not its narrow construction was correct, because the "business of
baseball" exemption was limited to a particular product market -
the market for exhibiting baseball games. 3 8 Ultimately, the Piazza
court concluded that the exemption was conduct-based and that
the "business of baseball" construction of the exemption was
market-based.
349. Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp.
1475, 1486 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
350. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489. The court reasoned that "baseball's rela-
tions with non-players are not a unique characteristic or need of the game." Id.
In 1961, Congress addressed baseball's relations with a group of non-players
when it enacted a statutory antitrust exemption protecting agreements covering
the telecast of professional sports contests. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
351. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
352. See id. at 1486-89.
353. Id. at 1489.
354. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
355. Id. at 438.
356. See id. at 439.
357. See id. at 441.
358. Id. at 439-40.
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VI. EPILOGUE: THE "ST. PETERSBURG GIANTS" LITIGATION
A. Butterworth and Piazza: The "Reserve System" Exemption Is
Incompatible with Flood
Buttenorth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs359
(Butterworth) was the companion litigation to Piazza. In Butterworth,
the Attorney General for the State of Florida issued civil investiga-
tive demands (CID) to the National League and its President pursu-
ant to Florida law.3 60 The National League petitioned the Florida
trial court to quash the CID on grounds that the Attorney General
lacked jurisdiction to investigate the matters relating to the sale of
the Giants because baseball was exempt from state and federal anti-
trust laws.3 61 The trial court issued an order to quash the CID.3 62
The trial court held that baseball's antitrust exemption protected
the matters which the Attorney General wanted to investigate. 363
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment without dis-
cussing the scope of the exemption.3 64
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed. 365 The court consid-
ered Finley and various other cases construing the exemption. 36
The court was persuaded by Piazza and chose to adopt the Piazza
interpretation because "none of the other cases have engaged in
such a comprehensive analysis of Flood and its implications."3 67 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida held that baseball's anti-
trust exemption does not extend to the "franchise sale and
relocation" context.
368
The problem with the "reserve system" exemption is that it is
based upon a blatant misconstruction of Flood. The Piazza and But-
terworth courts failed to reconcile their piecemeal interpretation of
359. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).




364. Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So.
2d at 1022.
365. Id. at 1025. SeniorJustice McDonald dissented, noting that the "exemp-
tion protects business activities which are directly related to the unique needs and
characteristics of professional baseball." Id. at 1026 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
According to Senior Justice McDonald, decisions like the one involved in National
League - decisions "concerning ownership and location of baseball franchises" -
are within the exemption's scope. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
366. See id. at 1022-25. Among those discussed were Federal Basebal Toolson
and Piaa Id.
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Flood with express language in the opinion indicating that the Flood
Court had no intention of limiting the exemption. Both the Piazza
and Butterworth courts emphasized the fact that the Flood Court ad-
mitted that professional baseball was engaged in interstate com-
merce, but both courts failed to put that admission in context.
Consider the following paragraph from the Flood opinion:
Accordingly, we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and
Toolson and to their application to professional baseball.
We adhere also to International Boxing and Radovich and to
their respective applications to professional boxing and
professional football. If there is any inconsistency or il-
logic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long
standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not
by this Court. If we were to act otherwise, we would be
withdrawing from the conclusion as to congressional in-
tent made in Toolson and from the concerns as to retro-
spectivity therein expressed.
3 69
The Piazza court contended that Flood narrowed the scope of base-
ball's antitrust exemption from its post-Toolson status (the "whole
business" exemption) to the reserve clause.370 As the above para-
graph indicates, one of the problems with the Piazza reasoning is
that the Flood Court expressly declined to narrow or alter the ex-
emption.37 1 The Flood Court believed that any alteration of the ex-
emption established in Federal Baseball and Toolson should be done
by Congress.372 This belief is absolutely irreconcilable with the Pi-
azza court's contention that the Flood Court narrowed the scope of
baseball's antitrust exemption.373
369. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
370. See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (discussing history of exemption).
371. See F/ood, 407 U.S. at 284.
372. Id.
373. One of the problems with the Piazza reasoning is that the Food Court did
not give legal effect to the contusion that baseball was engaged in interstate com-
merce; the flood Court refused to alter the reasoning supporting Federal Baseball
and Toolson. The Flood Court clearly admitted that professional baseball was a busi-
ness engaged in interstate commerce. However, such an admission does not mean
that the flood Court erased the rule of law established in Federal Baseball and
Toolso?.
The Food Court chose to leave the Federal Baseball reasoning intact for stare
decisis purposes. The flood Court recognized that, since professional baseball's
reliance on the exemption was significant, and since the American system of prece-
dent requires adherence to the reasoning and result of prior cases, it would be
impossible to have a case where the result is at odds with its reasoning (i.e. -
although engaged in interstate commerce, professional baseball is not subject to
antitrust laws). Hence, although recognizing that professional baseball was en-
[Vol. II: p. 213
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B. Conclusion
The history of baseball's three antitrust exemptions is confus-
ing. After the Flood decision, state and federal courts considering
the matter-of-law question of whether the exemption applies have
succeeded in creating three exemptions from what originally was
one. The critical observer need only consider the likely result if the
Piazza case were tried in a district court bound by Finley to realize
that the Piazza "reserve system" exemption is different from the Fin-
ley "whole business" exemption. Both the Piazza and Finley exemp-
tions are different than the Postema "reserve clause and league
structure" exemption.
Why are these distinctions important? It is clear that the Flood
Court intended that, absent congressional limitation, professional
baseball should continue to enjoy a certain level of antitrust protec-
tion. The Piazza, Finley and Postma cases demonstrate that the level
of antitrust protection contemplated in Flood is far from certain.
The fact that the Federal Baseball Court did not exempt professional
baseball from the antitrust laws combined with the use of ambigu-
ous language by the Toolson and Flood Courts in defining the scope
of the exemption created a situation where professional baseball's
antitrust protection is contingent upon a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum.374 The Flood Court clearly did not intend for the scope of
gaged in interstate commerce, the od Court perpetuated the "rejected" reason-
ing of Federal Baseball and Toolson in order to cater to MLB's assumed reliance
interest.
Also, Piazza fails to answer the following question: why would the United
States Supreme Court create a result stare decisis situation in flood, given that
Judge Padova admits that result stare decisis counters rule stare decisis, the princi-
ple upon which the American jurisprudential system is based? The Piazza analysis
does not make sense in this regard; the Piazza court performed a complex stare
decisis analysis of the Rood opinion which the flood Court did not endorse. See
Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437-38; see also Respondent's Answer Brief at 34, But-
terworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
1994) (No. 82,287) (sarcastically noting that correct interpretation of Flood eluded
everyone for 21 years before Judge Padova discovered it in Piazza); Lafferty, supra
note 14, at 1286 (noting that "Piazza successfully limited the exemption to profes-
sional baseball's reserve clause through the creative utilization of stare decisis").
374. Professor Stone offers a possible reason for the various interpretations of
the Flood opinion:
[H]owever much we try to conceal the truth by using singular terms like
"case," "precedent," "decision" or "holding," the truth is that the ratio
decidendi of a case has always to be sought in a body ofjudicial discourse,
that is, of communications by judges which enter the legal materials as a
more or less complex collocation of words in a written report. A case
consists, in short, of words and mostly ordinary words. And it follows
from this that what the ratio must or can be depends on the meaning of
this discourse, most of which ("legal" though it may be) is still ordinary
language. As such, for reasons already discussed, the symbols of which it
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baseball's antitrust exemption to be contingent on a litigant's
choice of forum.
The failure of the Toolson and Food Courts to clearly define the
scope of the exemption raises the issue as to whether baseball's an-
titrust exemption is entity-based (the exemption protects all activi-
ties of MLB from antitrust scrutiny) or conduct-based (the
exemption protects a certain range of activity by MLB from anti-
trust scrutiny). If the exemption is entity-based, MLB can never be
a defendant in an antitrust suit. If the exemption is conduct-based,
MLB can be subject to antitrust scrutiny only if its actions fall
outside the range of conduct protected by the exemption.
The Finly court concluded that the exemption is entity-based,
while the Piazza and Postema courts concluded that the exemption is
conduct-based. Given that the Federal Baseball Court held that the
Sherman Act did not apply to a particular entity (the business unit
engaged in the "business of exhibiting baseball games") or held
that the Sherman Act did not apply to a broad range of behavior
necessary to conduct the business of professional baseball, the Finley
and Postema exemptions are more accurate analogues of the Federal
Baseball holding than the Piazza exemption. However, since the an-
titrust exclusion established in Federal Baseball has been transformed
into an antitrust exemption, the Finley and Postema exemptions will
never be anything more than analogues of the Federal Baseball
ruling.
The quest to define the scope of baseball's antitrust exemption
is truly a riddle without one correct answer. The Rood Court stated
that the exemption "rests on a recognition of baseball's unique
characteristics and needs."3 75 This conclusion certainly is not sup-
ported by language in either Federal Baseball or Toolson. Courts and
commentators alike discuss the three opinions of the baseball anti-
trust trilogy as one unit without questioning whether the Federal
Basebal4 Tooson and Flood opinions stand for the same proposition.
The reality is that the three holdings do not stand for the same
proposition.
When the Toolson Court initially recognized an antitrust ex-
emption for professional baseball on the grounds of stare decisis,
the Federal Baseball exclusion became moot. Since the antitrust ex-
consists have potentially more than one meaning. The number of mean-
ings can be reduced, but it can rarely (if ever) be reduced to a point
when the mass of words in the whole discourse can bear only one mean-
ing for every later situation which can be argued to fall within its terms.
JuLIuS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAw 56 (1985).
375. Food, 407 U.S. at 282.
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clusion was transformed into an antitrust exemption, the relevant
question switched from being a mixed question of law and fact to
being solely a question of law. More specifically, the essential ques-
tion changed from being whether professional baseball is engaged
in interstate commerce to whether the challenged conduct falls
within the antitrust protection established by Toolson.
The Toolson Court offered little guidance in defining the scope
of the exemption. The Toolson Court used ambiguous language to
define the exemption's scope: a cryptic reference to Federal Base-
bal.3 76 The Flood Court merely recited the same language used in
Toolson.s 77 As a result, courts deciding the matter-of-law issue are
left to set the parameters of the exemption as they deem
appropriate.
While the quest to define the scope of the exemption is a rid-
dle without one answer, that does not mean that there are no
wrong answers. Regardless of the clarity of the Court's holdings in
Toolson and Flood, there is a line which separates a justifiable inter-
pretation of Flood from a violation of the Court's clearly-expressed
belief that, if the exemption is to be altered, Congress should do it.
The Piazza court crossed that line.
What should be done? Underlying professional baseball's
three antitrust exemptions is a public policy issue - should MLB
continue to enjoy protection from application of the antitrust laws?
Congress is the branch of government charged with the duty to
make that determination.378 Congress must soon decide whether
MLB should remain exempt from the antitrust laws. The prolifera-
tion in the number of exemptions indicates that the exemption is-
sue demands congressional consideration. Courts determining the
scope of baseball's antitrust exemption should not be allowed to
ignore the catcher's signals while they are on the mound.
376. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). The Tool-
son Court held that the business of baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws "so
far as [Federal Baseball] determines that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Id. At least one
commentator has suggested that the Federal Baseball Court did not make such a
determination. See McQuaide, supra note 208, at 98 ("Nowhere in the three page
opinion of Federal Baseball can there be found any mention of Congress' intention
that baseball was to be excluded from the scope of the antitrust laws as held by
Toolson.").
377. Food, 407 U.S. at 285 (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
378. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1956) (noting that Congress is bet-
ter suited than courts to confront issue of baseball's antitrust exemption).
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